Brief Considerations on
Determinism in Reality and Fiction
Frank Weinreich
Abstract
Determinism plays a crucial
role in considerations on ethics and free will. This is
true for the real world as well as for invented worlds like
Middle-earth. This paper discusses the issue of determinism
and non-determinism in reality and fiction on a basic level
and in conclusion shows how free will might very well exist
as a fact in the invented world of Middle-earth.
The article first apperead in: Frank Weinreich/ Thomas
Honegger (eds.): Tolkien and Modernity 1, Zürich, Bern
2006b. 135 - 144.
“Well, if one knew what the future held, say, defeat or
even victory,
would he try less hard, or instead more so, depending on
what he knew?
And if he changed his conduct because of knowing,
and thereby changed the outcome, would he not thwart
Destiny,
and thus perhaps upset the balance of all?”
Alain fell silent and looked ’round the table at pondering
faces.
Then he reached out and laid his hand atop Camille’s and
grinned, saying, “Besides, instead of knowing the future;
I’d much rather be surprised.”
Dennis L. McKiernan, Once Upon a Winter’s Night
Why might determinism be a
problem in reasoning about J.R.R. Tolkien’s fictional work?
It is because the question of determinism plays a crucial
role in every ethical discussion of free will, regardless
whether it turns up as a topic in reality or in
fiction.1 If one assumes (or
refutes) the existence of free will and therefore
responsibility for one’s actions as well as one’s
omissions, this assumption depends on one’s
understanding of determinism and on the exact nature of
determinism. If, on the one hand, one has to conclude
that binding determinism rules everything that is
happening or undertaken, than no one can be singled out
and given responsibility for the results of certain
undertakings or omissions. If, on the other hand, one
argues that determinism is not given or that its reach
does not cover completely the outcome of the reasonings
of sentient beings, then persons can be blamed or
praised for their actions. This is true for both reality
– or the Primary World, as Tolkien would have said –,
and for fiction – the Secondary, or Subcreated Worlds.
Thus, considerations on free will and, consequently,
also on determinism play an important role in the
interpretation of Tolkien’s works – the stories and lays
of Middle-earth being what they are: reports on the
struggle between good and evil carried out by or on the
backs of free or enslaved Valar, Maiar, Elves, Orcs,
Hobbits, Trolls, Dwarves, Dragons and Men.
Determinism in the
Primary World2
Physical and physiological processes, including the
observable3 processes inside
the brain which, as far as science can say, lead to
every deliberate action of sentient beings, are part of
a chain of causes and effects which does not allow for
any freedom in the sense of breaking out of said chain.
It was this chain of cause and effect that back in 1812
made the French physicist Pierre-Simon Laplace claim
that he could describe the exact state of the universe
at any point in the future, if only he had sufficient
means to calculate the data. While this was a slight
exaggeration, Laplace was right in principle. Everything
is part of cause and effect relations and therefore
computable in principle, at least as long as the world
is seen as monistic.4 And every
speculation on metaphysical constructs or beliefs are
just this – speculative.
The consequence of this seems to be that the world is
deterministic. This is even true in the light of quantum
mechanics, as Nikolaus Knoepfler has pointed out. Even if
on a subatomic level nondeterminism might be a fact, which
is not proven (1997:103), there exists no necessary
conclusion that nondeterminism on the micro level leads to
nondeterminism on the observable macro level – and even if
it did, random subatomic processes would still determine
the processes on the macro level, which does not lead to
freedom and free will of sentient beings (103). Again, even
considering the quantum level, determinism rules the
universe as long as one does not take refuge in dualistic
world views.
But does this observation really constitute such a problem
in ethical reasonings? It does! But then, does it really
lead to the dreaded anarchy of ubiquitous
non-responsibility? At first sight, determinism is very
problematic indeed. Yet if one takes a closer look first at
the difference between determinism and predictability and,
secondly, at the life people actually lead, the loopholes
for evil doers, claiming they could not act otherwise than
they had, for “I couldn’t help myself, Sir”, can be
plugged.
The important difference between predictability and
determinism gets confused sometimes. Chaos Theory might
provide a good picture of this. One of the main
realizations of Chaos Theory5 is the
unpredict¬ability of everything. Seemingly minimal
events can have immense effects. Often the famous
butterfly wing in the South American rain forest is
mentioned as an example: the beating of one butterfly
wing is said to cause a minimal irritation of currents
in the warm jungle air that, by means of various
amplifying confluences, cause a hurricane in Florida. Of
course, one would hardly think of that when enjoying the
beautiful play of sunlight on the blue wings of Morpho
peleides while vacating in Brazil. And that is exactly
the point of it. If one would catch the butterfly the
moment before it makes its fateful fluttering, one could
save lives and properties. Is the person to blame who
does not do so? Only in the case if she knew what would
occur ... and that she can never know, because, as Chaos
Theory states correctly, that is simply not predictable.
And yet it was the wing of the butterfly that determined
the outbreak of the storm. For ethical reasonings this
means that, though there is a deterministic flow of
causes and effects, people are still obliged to do what
is probably right6 at the moment they
consider a certain action.
If people started to catch every butterfly they could lay
hands on, it would most likely not result in peaceful
weather all around the world. But to stick a knife between
someone’s shoulder blades would most probably affect that
person negatively. For practical purposes, common sense and
the jurisdiction correctly assume that there is so much
freedom in people’s behaviour that choices between doing
something and omitting that something are given.7 The point in the
discussion of unpredictability and determinism is that
though everything in the material world is embedded in a
chain of cause and effect, the actions of people are
free in so far as human beings can predict the
consequences of their actions in most ethical relevant
cases to such an extent that one can act according to
this outlook, and in consequence can be held responsible
for one’s deeds.8 This assumption is
also called “practical realism“ (“praktischer
Realismus”, Knoepfler 1997:112): “Our whole life is
witness to the assumption that we think our lives are,
within certain limits, at our disposal” (114).9 This realism earns
the label ‘practical’ since it integrates the scientific
realization of determinism with the daily experience of
freedom, thus admitting a practical (and morally as well
as legally binding!) form of free will and
indeterminism. Although everything is determined (in a
monistic weltanschauung, and science can provide no
other), man, the human personality, as a result of
billions of forming (determining) influences, is an
acting entity in its own right that has the capability
of making responsible decisions – everything else would
be an incapacitation totally incongruent with the daily
experience of living in a society.
Determinism in the
Secondary world10
The same chain of cause and effect which rules everything
in the primary world is also observable in most invented
worlds, if only for the sake of allowing the reader to
follow the story. Stories which would constantly neglect
the patterns of cause and effect would probably be no
longer comprehensible. However, it would be possible for an
author to break out of the jail of deterministic laws of
the Primary World and invent new rules, at least for a part
or some aspects of her creation.
But it seems that for Middle-earth, its sub-creator J.R.R.
Tolkien does not claim this freedom of the
story-teller:11 “The country of
the book, Middle-earth, is a land much like our own, as
mythical, but no more so. [...] It is a world [...]
subject to natural law” (Beagle 1966:X). Hence
Middle-earth is a world in which the principles of
determinism rule. And it is a created world, a fact that
for the primary world, in which we live, can only be
speculated upon. So is everything set on its
predetermined way? That might well be so, but it need
not necessarily be so. At least two nondeterministic
explanations are possible.
The first one questions the extent of determination on a
macro level in Middle-earth. The world is created in a
deliberate act of will by a supreme being: Iluvatar.
Iluvatar uses music for bringing this universe of His into
physical being. The accords of this music follow patterns
which, in the end, lead to an unavoidable outcome not
unlike Judgement Day, which people of Christian faith
believe in. It remains unclear whether every detail in the
history of Middle-earth is foretold by Iluvatar, and, in
consequence, unavoidable, or whether only the general
outcome of salvational bliss is determined,12 while the way to
this end may just as well tumble along the extremes of
unpredictable catastrophes and periods of well being and
righteousness through the Ages. It is, for example,
possible that the Third Age could have ended with
Sauron’s triumph (after all, it was a very close call),
followed by thousands of years of utter despair for
Middle-earth’s inhabitants. If so, then the concept of
sentient beings, as devised by their Maker, might just
as well be sufficient to guarantee that at some time in
the future of a dark Fourth Age enough pure-hearted
people would arise to thwart Morgoth’s servant and allow
for a Fifth Age (and possible further ages) until the
music is reunited in the last and lasting theme.
The second explanation refers to the fact that Middle-earth
is not placed in a monistic universe. The cosmos of
Middle-earth is a dualistic one consisting of a material
plane (including Valinor) and a spiritual plane, i.e. the
nondescript place where Iluvatar resides. At least humans,
who do not reach the halls of Mandos after their demise,
seem to have a spiritual spark – a soul – and this soul
might just as well be free of the restraints of cause and
effect, and thus in itself a powerful new movens introduced
to the Secondary World.
Alternatively, men also might have been thrown into a
macrode¬terministic world in which the victory for Morgoth
and Sauron is impossible, just as Iluvatar had prophesied.
But even then men still could fail and be judged
accordingly – indeed, all of Middle-earth could be a
testing place for men. Frodo could have failed and could
have claimed the Ring for himself while still walking in
The Shire. Fate (Iluvatar) may then have chosen a worthier
Hobbit. Under slightly different circumstances, Denethor
might have withstood the mental onslaughts of Sauron
through the Palantír, but incidents would still have
followed nearly the same pattern on the Pelennor, before
the Black Gate and at Mount Doom. In a dualistic cosmos
these and other scenarios are possible and are not marred
by logical faults that might occur within a different
setting.
Conclusion
Empirically based scientific reasoning regarding
determinism in the Primary World leads to only one
realization – we live in a deterministic universe where
every incident is embedded in a chain of cause and effect.
That incidents are totally unpredictable and, on a quantum
level, might just as well be governed by random subatomic
processes, does not change this realization one bit. But
people live their lives on an ‘as if’-basis, acting ‘as if’
they had a freedom of choice. And, for all practical
pur¬poses, the sane mind does indeed have this freedom of
choice at her dis¬posal and is able to choose a course of
action at her own will. Fictitious worlds, like
Middle-earth, follow only the design of their creator and
can be deterministic, nondeterministic, or something
in-between. Middle-earth, as Tolkien has pointed out,
resembles in its makeup the Primary World. Hence it is
deterministic on a materialistic level. And even on the
spiritual level that is superimposed on the material level
of Arda determinism seems to be the dominant concept.
But although Middle-earth seems to be governed by
Iluvatar’s will, the efforts of the heroes of the Ring are
heroic and testify to a stern will to do the right thing.
They testify to a will that would have had the freedom to
refuse the tasks of the members of the fellowship at the
beginning, at least as far as they know.13 The heroes might
lead a deterministic life in the same sense of
determinism that we do. But it would also still have
been their admirable free choice to endure – the same
way someone in the Primary World acts heroic. Yet this
Secondary World is not only materialistic; and even
though Middle-earth is dualistic, there is still no
proof that Iluvatar’s – in principle unalterable –
design would not have allowed for freedom and free will
in a limited way, as I have tried to point out in the
second section of this paper: the determinism may not be
absolute, or, alternatively, some of the beings in Arda
have been created free. One just cannot say ... but I
believe that Tolkien meant his creatures to possess free
will, else their individual salvations and damnations
would lack any meaning.
1 The world in which we are living,
the third planet of a certain sun in one arm of the
spiral galaxy, called the Milky Way by the inhabitants
of the said planet, and the galaxy it is part of, and
also the universe in which this arrangement is placed,
are hereby referred to as reality. Fiction, for the
purposes of these considerations, are stories invented
by the inhabitants of said planet. I am aware that the
assumption that there exists a certain reality outside
the thinking of individuals is disputed by some
philosophers and quite a few intellectuals of various
professions. This is not the place to discuss the
underlying world views that feed these doubts about
reality (see Sandkühler 1999a for a brief summary of
this problem). It shall only be made explicit that the
following reasoning about reality is founded on the
“axiomatic as¬sumption” (Mayr 2000:61) that there is a
reality; that it is, in its existence as well as in
its properties, independent from human reasoning and
recognition (Sandkühler 1999b:1042), yet which people
consciously as well as unconsciously take for granted.
This is proven by the fact that they do take part in
discussions, a fact which would be pointless without
the assumption of some practical reality, for which
Nikolaus Knoepfler coined the term “practical realism”
(see below and Knoepfler 1997:112f.).
2 The terminology of one Primary and
many Secondary Worlds is based on Tolkien’s
writings. In his famous essay ‘On Fairy Stories’
Tolkien calls the world in which we live the
“Primary World” and, for invented worlds like
Middle-earth or those of other authors, he coins the
term “Secondary World[s]”. Both kind of worlds are
cre¬ated, the real world by God and the Secondary
Worlds by their narrators – a process he defined as
sub-creation, created after God’s creation and, for
the Catholic Tolkien, of course, in an inferior
manner.
3 “Observable“ through certain
technical picture producing methods like positron
emission tomography and other noninvasive or
invasive procedures.
4 Even dualistic world views
usually assume cause and effect scenarios,
especially in ethical considerations. But since
under dualistic or nonmaterialistic beliefs an
en¬tity of a different matter, often referred to
as the soul, is part of the discussion, it poses
no problem to describe this otherworldly matter
as free in principle, which on the other hand
means that the bearer of this soul is
responsible for her actions.
5 See Gleick 1987 for an
introduction to Chaos Theory.
6 This is not the place to
dwell on what ‘right’ means in this context,
since this an abstract line of thought that
in (moral) reality depends on the situation
and the op¬tions at hand.
7 And where they are not
given, as for example in the case of
mental illness, or not totally given, as
for example in the case of extreme poverty
of thieves, the deter¬mining causes for
morally and legally wrong behaviour are
usually taken into account, at least in
modern and democratic jurisdictions.
8 The problem of
responsibility increases with the
complexity of situations. While it is
not hard to determine that violent
behaviour against people who cannot
defend themselves is not right, it might
be hard to judge whether participating
in genetic research on gene manipulation
is right or wrong in the sense of
whether said re¬search may prove
beneficial or harmful in the end. But
even informed considera¬tions, which,
for example, put the benefit of patients
above economical interests of the
commercial sponsors of that research,
can draw sufficient guidelines to
morally correct choices for or against
the participation in complex issues.
9 “[U]nsere ganze
Praxis legt davon Zeugnis ab, daß wir
in bestimmten Grenzen über unser Leben
zu verfügen meinen” (Knoepfler
1997:114).
10
See
footnote 2 for an explanation of the
nomenclature of counting different
worlds.
11
I am
not going speculate on the reasons
why the author is not using this
freedom, but explanations, which
take into account Tolkien’s
obsession with the ‘historical
truth’ of Middle-earth, which can
only resemble ‘truth’ in reality
if the history and makeup of
Middle-earth also follow cause and
effect-chains, seem to point in
the right direction.
12
The
questionability of the amount of
determinism is only one point.
Another point can be made by
discussing the difference
between foresight and
determinism. Might it not be
that Illuvatar has ‘only’
foreseen what would come? That
he was omniscient but not
almighty? That the happy ending
of the Middle-earthian uni¬verse
was due to most of its
inhabitants being ‘good’ on a
very basic level, so that evil
could not persist? Other points
could be made ...
13
At least the
Four Hobbits do not seem to
have a very clear idea of the
spiritual na¬ture of
Middle-earth (see Weinreich
2005 for a discussion of their
ethical motiva¬tions).
FRANK WEINREICH studied
philosophy, communication
sciences and politics in the
early Nineties and holds a PhD in
philosophy from the University of
Vechta. He is working as
independent scholar, freelance
author and editor in Bochum,
Germany since 2001. His interests
focus on ethics, bioethics, media
ethics, tech¬nology assessment,
education, new media, fantasy and
science fiction and, of course,
on Tolkien’s works. He has
published numerous books,
articles and essays and is
co-editor of Hither Shore, the
Scholarly Journal of the German
Tolkien Society and co-editor of
Stein und Baum, a German source
for fantasy literature and works
on fantasy. He may most easily be
contacted through his
professional homepage
www.textarbeiten.com or via his
private Tolkien-Site which at the
moment carries nearly forty
articles, essays and stories on
Tolkien and Middle-earth:
www.polyoinos.de/tolk_stuff.
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New York: Ballantine Books, pp.
IX-XVI.
Gleick, James, 1987, Chaos.
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Honegger, Thomas, Andrew James
Johnston, Friedhelm Schneidewind,
Frank Weinreich, 2005, Eine
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Edition Stein und Baum.
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(Bochum 04/08)